

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2868
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03193

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV, RH
SUBJ: RHODESIA: ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE

1. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL WAS AN ATTEMPT TO COME UP WITH AN PROPOSAL THAT ADVANCED THE POTENTIAL FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BRITISH AND THE UNITED NATIONS. THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS WOULD COOPERATE WITH US AS LONG AS OUR INTENTIONS WERE HONORABLE, AND WE ENVISAGED SMITH STEPPING DOWN IN THE FACE OF OUR APPARENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLOUT IF IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE WEST, THE BRITISH AND THE U.S. WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN BEHALF OF SMITH AND THE INTERNAL REGIME.

2. IN LATE 1977 AND EARLY 1978, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE FRONTLINE WAS WILLING TO PRESSURE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT
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TO MEET WITH US TO BRING THE IMPASSE TO A CONCLUSION BECAUSE THEY WERE AWARE THAT THE ARMED STRUGGLE WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING DOWN SMITH. AND ALTHOUGH THE BISHOP AND SITHOLE HAD NO REAL FIGHTING TROOPS, THEY WERE CREDITABLE NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, SINCE MARCH 3, 1978, MOST OF THE

FRONTLINE WOULD QUESTION THE LEVEL OF CREDIBILITY AFFORDED TO THE TWO INTERNAL NATIONALIST LEADERS, AND LIKEWISE WOULD INSIST THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THEIR IMPACT ON THE "BOYS IN THE BUSH." NOW BOTH SMITH AND THE FRONTLINE HAVE COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION, NAMELY THAT THE BISHOP AND SITHOLE CAN'T BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE OR INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY.

3. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, ONE MUST ASK WHAT ARE WE LIKELY TO DISCUSS AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE. WILL WE BE ABLE TO DISCUSS KEEPING THE CIVIL SERVICE INTACT AND MINIMAL CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLICE PLUS THE SELECTIVE DISMANTLING OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES AS WE DISCUSSED IN MALTA? CAN WE EXPECT THE FRONTLINE TO CONTINUE ALONG THE LINES OF THE DAR ES SALAAM SUMMIT WHERE THEY APPEARED WILLING TO ACCEPT AN INTEGRATION OF THE POLICE WITH PF FORCES AND THE SELECTIVE DISMANTLING OF THE SECURITY FORCES? IN MALTA AND IN DAR THEY DISCUSSED DOMINATING THE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENT, BUT PRIVATELY ALLOWED IT TO BE KNOWN THAT WHAT THEY EXPECTED WAS PARITY. IS PARITY TO BE EXPECTED AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE? IN DAR THE BRITISH AND THE U.S. INSISTED THAT THE PF AGREE TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE WITH NO PRE-CONDITIONS. WITH NO PRE-CONDITIONS, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE PF TO ARRIVE AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE PREPARED TO DISCUSS A POSITION IN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE TRANSITION, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THEY FEEL THEY HOLD ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.

4. AND THAT IS WHERE OUR PROBLEM LIES. THEY FEEL THEY CONTROL ACCESS TO A MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY, AND THEY INSIST THEY ARE A MAJOR MILITARY FORCE IN THE AREA. THEY INSIST THEY KNOW WHAT THEY MUST DO BETWEEN NOW AND THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS WHICH IS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CONTROL OF MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE ELECTIONS DO NOT TAKE PLACE IN RELATIVE PEACE AND QUIET.

5. HOWEVER, THE REPORT LANGUAGE OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE COMPROMISE ON THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL SAYS IN ITEM B: "IN THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS, IF THE ELECTIONS ARE INCOMPLETE BECAUSE OF INTERRUPTION BY TERRORISTS, THE ELECTION RESULTS WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED INCOMPLETE," AND IN ITEM A: "IF THE CONDITIONS EXPRESSED IN THE BILL LANGUAGE WERE MET, THE PRESIDENT IS OBLIGED TO COMPLY AND LIFT THE

SANCTIONS." I ASSUME THE CONFEREES MEAN THAT IF THE
PF IS SUCCESSFUL IN DISRUPTING THE ELECTIONS
AND MR. SMITH HAS DONE THE BEST HE CAN TO CONDUCT
ELECTIONS, THEN WE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT THE
ELECTION RESULTS. AND IF THE PF IS NOT SUCCESSFUL IN
DISRUPTING THE ELECTIONS AND MR. SMITH HAS DONE HIS
BEST TO CONDUCT "VIETNAM-STYLE" ELECTIONS, THEN WE WILL
BE OBLIGED TO GO ALONG WITH THE RESULTS AND LIFT
SANCTIONS. WE MUST ASSUME THAT HELMS AND ICHORD
ARE IN CLOSE ENOUGH TOUCH TO HAVE INFORMED SMITH OF THIS
TURN OF EVENTS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03193

6. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL WAS
ALL ABOUT. THE AAP WAS A DETERMINATION TO STOP THE
FIGHTING AND RE-INSTITUTE BRITISH AUTHORITY TO PREPARE
THE WAY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS THAT WOULD BRING
ABOUT GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND HOPEFULLY ESCAPE A
BLOODY CIVIL WAR. THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE LANGUAGE
SENDS A MESSAGE TO SMITH AND COMPANY THAT ALL THEY HAVE
TO DO IS SHOW UP AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE AND APPEAR
TO BE NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH (WHICH COULD SIMPLY MEAN
BEING PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE FORMULATIONS OF MALTA OR DAR)
AND RETURN TO SALISBURY AND ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS,
AS BEST THEY CAN.

7. THE CONFERENCE REPORT HAS ONLY SEMI-LEGAL STATUS. IT MAY HELP CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN A COURT ACTION, BUT IT IS NOT ITSELF THE LAW OF THE LAND, OTHERWISE THERE IS NO EXECUTIVE ROLE IN THIS PROCESS. SOME PARLIAMENTARY
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RULING ON THIS SHOULD BE SOUGHT EARLY.

8. AT THIS POINT THE ILLUSION OF POWER BECOMES EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, BECAUSE THE ILLUSION OF RESPECTABILITY WILL HAVE PASSED. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE DISCUSSIONS OF MALTA AND DAR ES SALAAM.

9. BRITISH MP JOHN DAVIES AND BRITISH NEWSPAPERS HAVE BEGUN TO DISCUSS THE NEED FOR PLANS FOR EVACUATING MANY OF THE SETTLERS FROM RHODESIA, AND MEMBERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRONTLINE ARE DISCUSSING A DISGUISED NEGOTIATED SURRENDER WITH MINORITY PARTICIPATION OF THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENT IN A TRANSITION.

10. I AM ANXIOUS TO HEAR THE THOUGHTS OF SPAIN, DEPRES, NORLAND, BREWSTER, LOW, AND EASUM ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE AND ON WHAT YOU ARE HEARING AT YOUR RESPECTIVE POSTS.
LEONARD

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